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Abstract ________________________________ _ 
The large influence of the automotive industry in the global economy is widely recognised. This sector 
has undergone enormous changes in order to be ready for the fierce competence of the next to come 
21 st century. Among theses transformations, the most relevant are those technologies developed for the 
rapid evolution of the activities linked to new designs, new products, and new manufacturing processes 
and systems, which aim to cope with the always innovative Japanese car makers. 
International technology alliances may be one option to gain access to the brand new competitive 
technologies. At the same time, the risks and costs associated with new product development are 
shared among the allies, as well as the manufacturing facilities and production capabilities. 
Sometimes, the agreement may even give place to the deployment of new capabilities. In spite of its 
many potentialities, the literature presents the success rate of alliances being below a 50 percent. 
Our study considers two examples of companies that developed international joint ventures (UVs) , 
Rover with Honda, and Seat with Volkswagen, respectively. Since these two European peripheral 
companies, Rover and Seat, no longer remain as independent firms, we are interested on identifying 
the reasons leading to the success or failure of these UVs as regards the New Product Development 
(NPD) process. In spite of the fact that most of the literature characterises the strategic technology 
alliances as highly successful, new empirical evidences are questioning that consensus. In particular, 
some recent cases are bringing into the limelight the dangers associated to enter an UV when one of 
the partners is weaker than the other and it does not have a well defmed strategy. The weakest firm 
can become completely reliant on its associate, thus aggravating and accentuating its constraints. Our 
article addresses the question of possible dependencies along the NPD process in the Rover and Seat 
cases and looks for an answer to the question of how such type of addiction affects the survival of the 
firms. 
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1. The state ofthe art 
After the merger and acquisition boom of the eighties, the decade of the nineties have assisted to 
the growth of strategic alliances and international joint ventures (INs) as a means of achieving a 
range of corporate objectives. As an important explanatory factor for the alliance trend, it has been 
argued that alliances and INs provide a platform for organisational learning, giving access to the 
skills and capabilities of their partners (Inkpen and Crossan, 1995; Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; 
Ritcher and Vettel, 1995; Westney, 1988). Competition is becoming more and more knowledge-
based as firms strive to learn and to develop capabilities faster than their rivals (Teece and Pisano, 
1994), leading to an increasing number of alliances with learning from partners as a primary goal 
(Ham el, 1991; Huber, 1991). Inkpen (1998, 224) estimates that the number of strategic alliances 
formed grown upper than 25% since 1990. 
In this context, we define the concept of strategic alliance as a "long-term co-operative 
arrangement between two or more independent firms that engage in business activities for mutual 
economic gain" (Tsang, 1998, 209). S~resen and Reve (1998, 151) argue that "strategic alliances 
can be conceptualised as modes of organisation that can be used by companies to prepare 
themselves for competitive positioning. Thus, purposeful arrangements among distinct but related 
business organisations that allow the partners to gain sustained competitive advantage vis-a-vis 
their competitors outside the alliance (Jarillo, 1988)". We will define a Joint Venture (N) as a 
means of performing activities in combination with one or more firms instead of autonomously 
(Inkpen and Crossan, 1995,595). 
Grant and Baden-Fuller (1995) affirm that through "learning alliances" firms can speed 
capability development and minimise their exposure to technological uncertainties by acquiring and 
exploiting knowledge developed by others. Nonaka (1991), has stated that in times of rapidly 
changing market conditions and increasingly shorter product life cycles, companies are only able to 
sustain their successful position with a continuous generation of new knowledge, its fast spreading 
within the whole organisation and its conversion into new technologies. Then, it is very likely that 
some joint ventures are formed to explore interfirm differences in skills. So far, if we admit the 
above premises, we are assuming that, under a given set of conditions, companies that require to 
. permanently renew it knowledge basis should embark into strategic technology alliances to remain 
competitive. Recent work on alliances and the role of firms specificity knowledge in firm strategy 
(Mowery et aI., 1996, 78) suggest additional motives and effects of alliance formation. Rather than 
using alliances to acquire capabilities, scholars suggest that firms use inter firm collaboration to gain 
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access to other firms' capabilities, supporting more focused, intensive exploitation of existing 
capabilities within each firm (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995; Nakamura et aI., 1996). The category 
of strategic technology partnering that we are considering here is the one suggested by Hagedoorn 
and Narula (1996), that involves contractual alliances covering a relatively large group of 
partnerships without equity sharing, such as joint development agreements, joint research parts, 
cross licensing, second-sourcing agreements, mutual second sourcing, and R&D contracts. 
There are several very well known research lines in the field of strategic alliances, as Figure 
I depicts. 
INSERT FIGURE I ABOUT HERE 
Although strategic alliances devoted to developing new assets (technology) represent an 
important target for research (S~rensen and Reve, 1998, 151), work on strategic alliances has 
recently begun to address issues of organisational learning and renewal (Anderson, 1990; Inkpen, 
1995; 1998; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Inkpen and Crossan, 1995). There is also a growing body 
of theoretical research and empirical studies (Dogson, 1993; Hamel, 1991; Simonin and Helleloid, 
1993) addressing the issue of how organisations exploit N learning opportunities. The existing 
literature lacks of a clear linkage between concepts related to organisational learning and learning 
through N s; it also lacks of a clear view of the way in which capabilities and strategies are 
conditioned by the historical development of the parties concerned (Doz, 1991, 96; Geringer and 
Hebert, 1991). 
This paper constitutes an exploratory attempt to explain how strategic technology partnering 
affect the organisational learning process, allowing the partners to acquire the skills and capabilities 
that are needed for strategic development (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989; 1990). We consider strategic 
technology partnering as inter-firm co-operation for which a combined innovative technological 
activity or an exchange of technology is at least part of an agreement. More particularly, we are 
concerned with the development of the core capabilities linked to the processes of strategic design and 
manufacturing of new products. We are also assuming that the partners can co-operate in certain areas, 
but they still compete with each other in other areas (Hamel, 1992; Pucik, 1988), i. e., what Schill et al. 
(1994,262) describe as a horizontal alliance scenery. 
Such alliances may imply a high risk of alliance instability, since the alliance knowledge may 
become not accessible. An array of diverse situations may happen. For instance, one of the partners 
may have a limited incentive to share its knowledge if such sharing could potentially lead to the 
creation of a competitor, as suggested by Inkpen (1998, 225). There is also the risk that one partner 
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may acquire knowledge that it lacked at the time of the alliance formation, and as soon as this 
knowledge is acquired, such partner may decide to cease the joint venture. It might happen as well 
that a dependent relationship develops, as the weaker partner does not learn as expected and it can't 
react on time to the increasing pace of new products and processes innovations. Therefore, when 
horizontal alliances are considered, it is very likely that they mostly take place for what Schill et al. 
(1994, 262) have termed "pre-competitive" activities, so that main risks regarding the potential loss 
of competitive position of the "teacher" partner are kept to a minimum. 
Our position is that "teacher" partners do limit the transfer of knowledge to their "student" 
allies, so that these late ones won't in the long run perform better than their "teachers" will do. The 
scope and length of the learning process will be constrained by the premise of reducing the 
variability of the performance of the "student" firms, rather than its increasing. Then, as March 
(1991) has pointed out, learning makes the performance of the students more reliable, contributing 
this way to the reliability of the performance of the teachers, as well as to its increasing. Then, 
whenever the teacher partner is heavily focused on financial performance issues, it won't be 
concerned with reinforcing learning from its students, unless the students by themselves are able to 
generate enough resources as to compensate the efforts of their teaching without eroding the 
(financial) competitiveness of the teacher. We agree with Inkpen (1998, 227) suggestion that in the 
face of poor alliance (financial) performance, the teacher firm will become reluctant to commit to 
or even try out proposals generated at the alliance level. Thus, while poor (financial) performance 
can lead to myopia that acts as a barrier to knowledge creation, the student partner may feel that the 
alliance doesn't yield satisfactory organisational performance because learning opportunities have 
been unexploded. 
The outstanding problem is that student firms use to lack the financial resources required to 
source their investments in R & D processes, NPD activities, and so on, being this one of the main 
reasons to look for a strategic technology alliance with a teacher partner. Then, any student firm 
with financial problems that is willing to learn from a teacher partner by means of a strategic 
alliance should take into account that it will only be allowed a limited learning, while some of its 
assets may be taken as hostage by the teacher ally. When trying to protect its assets, the student is 
caught in a dilemma, whereby, as stated by S$rensen and Reve (1998, 151) "one hand it need to 
protect its own specific assets, and on the other it wish to share its assets in the strategic alliance". 
So far, learning through alliances has always a cost, which is a function of dependence and 
the willingness to remain dependent. Some student firms may decide to become and remain 
dependent on the teacher firm, in the conviction that they would gain a progressive access to the 
teacher's knowledge, -in spite of their limited chances to gather some learning through the alliance. 
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This lead us to the situation described by Nakamura et al. (1996), as one of "divergent 
development", i. e., partners decline technological overlap, which suggests that some alliances are 
vehicles for accessing rather than acquiring capabilities. Such sequential and scarce access to 
knowledge, instead of its acquisition, could be considered by these student firms as an enabler of 
their future independence from the teacher partner. 
This is, however, a misleading conviction, which will prevent the student firm from 
developing a thorough understanding of its own knowledge, the processes by which it converts 
knowledge to capabilities, and the capacity of these capabilities to meet the demands of its 
environments. When the student firms become addicted to the technological development pace of 
their teacher partners, they lose what Lane and Lubatkin (1998, 474) have defined as "the required 
level of self-awareness to quickly react to the market forces that inevitably rode the combined 
strategic value of their sets of capabilities". Consequently, it is very likely that these firms will 
compromise their chances of developing effective new capabilities on its own and they will 
probably be unable to identify their future best-qualify teachers. 
In this paper we analyse the technological alliances that Rover and Seat signed with Honda 
and Volkswagen, respectively. Of primary interest in our article is that we are dealing with two 
horizontal alliances, where two technologically weaker companies looked for gaining access to the 
skills and knowledge of their corresponding teacher partners as regards New Product Development 
(NPD). According to the existing literature, Rover and Seat signed the alliances to increase their 
knowledge and to develop core capabilities that would led to outstanding improvements of their 
NPDs. It is very likely that both Rover and Seat were using their alliances as a substitute for the 
knowledge that they weren't able to create. Under such scenery, they could be content to remain 
dependent on their partners and forget the objective of knowledge acquisition. But then, if the 
alliances were terminated, as they happened to be, the dependent firms, -Rover and Seat- would 
probably find that their knowledge base was eroded. We strongly believe that both Rover and Seat 
placed a high value on alliance knowledge and were seeking to acquire the knowledge. Finding 
why things didn't evolve as in the NUMMI case, -or like in the more recent one of the Auto 
Europa, the Joint Venture of Ford and Volkswagen in SetUbal, Portugal, is one of our main tasks 
along the next sections of this article. We aim at to determine whether or not a technological 
addiction developed between Rover and Honda, and/or Seat and Volkswagen. In case of such 
addiction have taken place, we are interested on identifying how it matured and spread across both 
student firms, as well as its related costs. Accordingly, the paper examines the developments, and 
under-developments, in the design and manufacturing capabilities at the Rover Group and Seat, as a 
result of their respective ties with Honda and Volkswagen. 
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Different researches have claimed that the complexity of strategic alliances and INs has 
been a major obstacle for their studies. Looking for a reasonable solution to such a problem, we 
have used multiple sources of data as a means of gaining a more complete picture of the 
technological addiction phenomenon. The first source of data was one in depth case study of Seat, 
developed by Alvarez and Gonzalez (1997) and conducted between 1993 and 1997. This case was 
confronted with international literature on the Rover case. We are particularly in debt with 
Pilkington (1996, 1998), whose research work gave us access to a very well documented 
knowledge on the British company. He prepared the Rover case using data gathered from public 
sources, action research and interviews conducted between 1987 and 1994, when the company was 
finally acquired by BMW and the Honda relationship ended (pilkington, 1996). These two case 
studies generated our proposition regarding the direct relationship between technological 
addictions and the absence of technological strength that characterised the two peripheral European 
carmakers. 
A second source of data generated additional support for the importance of the research 
question. This data source is longitudinal and it is related to a former project initiated by one of the 
authors (Gonzalez, 1998). He has studied the complete evolution of Seat from its old days ti111996, 
analysing the company reports and accounts, and interviewing significant representatives of the 
former Spanish firm. He has also checked the Seat financial figures against those shown by the 
other automobile producers operating in Spain along the 1982-1992 period. The third source of data 
is the study accomplished by Alaez et al. (1996), which deals with the Spanish OEM suppliers 
operating in the Pais Vasco and Navarra regions in 1994-1995, a population which represents a 
25% of the Spanish sales figure. 
Therefore, we have applied the methodology of a deductive case study, based on the cases 
of Rover and Seat firms and their respective strategic alliances with Honda and Volkswagen in the 
early eighties. Thus, we are dealing with an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in its.own context, where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
very clearly evident, and in which mUltiple sources are used (Yin, 1989). Our study can be ranked 
as a qualitative one, which tries to obtain information about how companies develop technological 
addictions. 
The article is organised as follows. We analyse in Section 2 why car firms need to enter 
Strategic Alliances. Then, we describe in Sections 3 and 4 the Rover and Seat cases, including a 
parsimonious description of the contents of both alliances, and we provide detailed schedules of the 
launching of new products. In Section 5 we analyse the results of both alliances and try to isolate 
the suggested technological dependence. Some managerial implications for firms seeking strategic 
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alliances, as well as some essential clues for failure avoiding are provided in the sixth section, as 
well as some suggestions for future research into the complex scenery of these addictive 
relationships. 
2. Why should carmakers sign strategic alliances? 
Ten years ago, Kobayashi (1988, 29) announced that alliances would be increasingly used 
along the nineties in order to the development of high-tech automobiles, the reinforcing of the 
design, and the improvement of the distribution channel. Besides, as the spread of the technological 
revolution would allow for changes in the comparative cost structure of the different facilities, 
some automotive manufacturers in advanced countries could no longer afford to produce at home. 
He concluded that: "inter - and intra- industry alliances of both a domestic and international 
dimension had become a strategy which many companies in the automotive industry would like to 
pursue" (1988,30). This argument has also been supported by Burgers et al. (1993). 
Savary (1995, 149) has described that all the European and American car manufacturers had 
to face the same challenges in the 1980s. First, since the demand grew more slowly, competition 
became more acute. Secondly, products and process innovations led to changes in the competitive 
priorities, increasing the concern for higher quality and lower costs and prices. Thirdly, the surge of 
the Japanese firms, with their "lean approaches" to production and operations management. The 
European automobile production system saw a major change in the eighties, particularly in the 
United Kingdom and Spain, which have been claimed by Hudson and Schamp (1995, 224) to 
represent the first tentative steps towards a new system, whose main features are Japanisation, 
Europeanisation, and relocation of automobile suppliers. One of the first consequences of the 
Japanese firms entering in Europe has been the increasing competence in the segment of medium-
sized models, while Spain and the Southern Italy were gaining market share in the niche of the 
small-sized vehicles. As a matter of fact, Spain was able in that decade to successfully initiate its 
fully integration into the European automobile system (Lagendijk, 1994). 
The automobile producers operating in Europe followed two strategic responses in the late 
eighties. The first one was the change in their approach aiming at to increase their R&D and 
manufacturing activities, in order to acquire quality levels similar to those of their Japanese 
competitors, as well as reducing the costs. The second strategy was to develop international co-
operation agreements as a means of increasing efficiency. The more frequent type of agreement 
was the one oriented to achieve scale economies between European firms, like Renault and Volvo 
in 1990. A second usual type of agreement has been the one oriented to the enlargement of the 
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product range, with new specialised vehicles, and they included both distribution and 
manufacturing. Most of them pursued to develop new key components such as engines or 
transmissions and/or new car models. The 1982's agreement between Seat and Volkswagen can be 
considered a prototype of this approach. It wasn't very frequent to sign agreements with the 
Japanese as a route to learning about their manufacturing approaches, -like lean production-. The 
most relevant agreement of this last type was the one between Rover and Honda. A third approach 
was to go after the growth ofintemalisation trough direct investments and exports, deployed by all 
the European automobile producers, in order to increase size, reduce costs and improve 
competitiveness. 
It is also worthwhile to remember that the European market for car components is 
characterised by a huge number of relatively autonomous finns (Richter and Wakuta, 1993, 265). 
Supplier-consumer networks within the European car industry rely on a high amount of autonomy. 
However, if suppliers play an integral role in developing the new car, it should help reduce design 
changes and improve quality. Furthennore, manufacturing from modular options means that 
cannakers require smaller facilities, with fewer tools and machinery. Then, as suppliers have 
become more important, the "assemblers" have started to devote more resources to working with 
them. 
Ford, for instance, began rethinking its supplier relations as far back as 1982, when it 
discover that using thousands of suppliers created extra costs for record keeping, logistics 
management, and inventory control. Quality also suffered because each additional supplier 
increased the variability of the manufacturing process. Following this line of reasoning, Taylor 
(1994, 53) cautions us that "more and more carmakers are turning to independent suppliers to 
provide such critical components as instrument panels, seats and electronics. By assembling these 
parts off site, then bolting them into the car on the assembly line, the auto companies are behaving 
more like personal computer makers than traditional, vertically integrated manufacturers". This 
implies that car makers have been, and still are, looking for suppliers capable of not just making a 
part but also designing it, engineering it, integrating it with surrounding parts, and delivering it 
globally. 
On the other hand, Japanese manufacturers try to convince their domestic suppliers to build 
manufacturing sites in the newly conquered markets because of their long tenn co-operation and 
proven reliability. Some Japanese suppliers have already invested in the UK to serve the Honda, 
Toyota and Nissan factories. It is very likely that by signing a strategic alliance with Rover, Honda 
was looking for an entrance in the UK components market, to warranty its suppliers the economic 
feasibility of their investments and innovations. 
8 
It is also very probably that both Honda and Volkswagen could have considered they could 
supply their ventures with Rover and Seat with their products or services, since there is a tendency 
for companies entering partnerships to see a special opportunity in becoming a supplier to the new 
venture. As suggested by Shaughnessy (1995, 16): "It means income without any real marketing or 
selling, -an easy way to shove money through to the bottom-line and a way of taking risk investment 
back in the short term ". 
Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) have demonstrated that international strategic technology 
partnering in high-tech industries appears to be disproportionately organised through contractual 
arrangements, whereas other sectors with lower levels of technological sophistication have a higher 
share of joint venturing. The automotive industry occupies an intermediate situation between high 
and medium technological levels; thus, the probability of finding joint ventures and contractual 
agreements is very high. Due to that peCUliarity, Kobayashi (1988) suggested the relationships 
between the need for continual updating of the car makers capabilities and the strategic alliances as 
facilitators of this up-to-date. More recently, Hayes et al. (1996) have proposed that this trend is 
also strongly related to the aim of building skills in new market sectors, such as the small cars in 
the USA, or the four-wheel drive, leisure vehicles, in Europe. Hamel (1991) and Teramoto et al. 
(1993) have shown that the Japanese firms particularly aim at the generation of knowledge through 
joint ventures with competitors. In contrast, Western firms seem to pay less attention to the 
acquisition of knowledge through interfirm co-operation. 
Glaister and Buckley (1996, 304) have proposed the following reasons to explain why 
strategic alliances have become so trendy in the automotive industry. Festival, the production 
process in the automobile sector is characterised by economies of scale and learning by doing; thus, 
firms may attempt to reduce costs expanding out to achieve these benefits. Strategic alliances allow 
firms in the same industry to rationalise production, thus reducing costs through economies of scale 
and learning by doing, while avoiding the uncertainties and difficulties of full-scale merger (Mariti 
and Smiley, 1983). Production can be transferred to the lower cost location thus lowering 
procurement costs. Furthermore, the larger volume produced in the more advantageous location 
also provides further reductions in average unit costs by realising economies of large-scale 
production (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Secondly, the alliances may be used to bring together 
complementary skills and talents that cover different aspects of the know-how needed in high 
technology industries, as well as the necessary manufacturing, scale and distribution outlets. 
Thirdly, strategic alliances may be used as a defensive ploy to reduce competition (Harrigan, 
1985). Alternatively, linking with a rival in order to put some pressure on the profits and market 
share of a common competitor may be use an alliance as an offensive strategy. In fourth place, the 
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alliance fonnation may help finns to move to new foreign markets and to the development of either 
a multi-domestic or global strategy. The speed of market entry may therefore be an important 
detenninant of the choice of entry mode (Gannon, 1993) Speed of entry must be balanced, 
however, against the associated cost and risk. Besides, a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) may 
decide that a strategic alliance may be very much preferred to a subsidiary, because it can provide 
various economic, political, and market access benefits to foreign partners. 
As Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate, every international carmaker was involved in at least one 
IN before 1996. According to these figures, it seems that in the 1990's, European car 
manufacturers are concentrating on their own region, with a local or regional production basis, and 
often a regional market basis. Their competitors are "multiregional" finns with important 
investments in South East Asia, Europe and North America. The business environment of the early 
eighties, whereby Rover and Seat signed their respective agreements, was a slightly different one, 
as shown by Figure 5. 
INSERT FIGURES 2, 3,4, and 5, ABOUT HERE 
3. The Alliance Rover I Honda 
As it has been described by Barrie (1995), Bertodo (1990), Hudson and Schamp (1995), 
Pilkington (1996), (1998), and Schill et el. (1994), among others, we have to look at the historical 
development of the finn to understand the reasons which led Rover to enter the relationship with 
Honda. 
In the first years of the decade of the seventies, most of Rover's products lines were outdated 
and unprofitable and its dimension was not adequate to benefit from scale economies, making quite 
difficult for the carmaker to react to European and Japanese competitors. Austin Rover had the skills 
and resources to develop replacement models, but its programmes to replace its ageing models were 
behind schedule. After the merger of the majority of the British motor industry, i.e., Austin, Morris and 
Leyland in 1973, the "new" company was renamed British Leyland Motor Company (BLMC), and it 
was expected that this merger would allow to cut costs and retain market share (Church, 1994). 
Nevertheless, BLMC was unable to match the R&D levels of its main competitors: Ford UK and 
Vauxhall (GM). Suffering from strong financial problems, the finn invited the Government to 
intervene and the group was nationalised in December 1974. 
The Ryder Plan Report, a Parliamentary study dated 1975, pointed out several important 
problems in BLMC, such as out-dated machinery and facilities, weak organisational structure and lack 
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of a common rational plan for all merged plants. In 1977 a new name was given to the firm, BL, as 
well as a new Managing Director, -Mr. Edwardes-, whose main task was to rationalise the models and 
markets of the company. The rationalisation trend led him to close down Speke and Seneffe in 
Belgium, as well as to dismantle some production lines at Cowley and the Land and Range Rover 
plant at Solihull. It implied to halve the production volume between 1977 and 1980. Furthermore, the 
plant near Oxford was reorganised to manufacture upper and medium cars. 
The most challenging task was to radically change the awful reputation of the vehicles (poor 
quality and reliability) and to renew the product range. It was not going to be easy, since the design 
resources were very much chaotically mixed and had been cut in the believing that high volume 
manufacturing would become the solution for BL. Under such scenery, Edwardes (1983,193) 
considered that a Japanese partner would be much more convenient than a European one, and BL and 
Honda did at least have something to offer each other. 
According to Schill et al. (1994, 263), Honda needed and wanted access to the European 
market, knowledge about that market, and the establishment of a local ring of suppliers in the U. K. 
capable of meeting its quality requirements. This would move Honda to compliance with local content 
regulators. 
The 1979's deal with Honda was intended to provide a car model to produce for two or three 
years while the MontegolMaestro design was being completed. As Pilkington (1998) emphasises, 
"Honda had design strengths in just the areas that had been allowed to let slip under the BL 
reorganisations: engines and gearboxes. BL, for its part, had European design studios, which would 
improve the styling of the Japanese products and make them more attractive to customers both at 
home and abroad. Honda s strength of organisation and efficient methods of production, together with 
the products themselves, were also seen by Edwardes as desirable role models to follow". 
Following Pilkington (1998) article, we have developed Figure 6, which aims at summarising 
how the strategic alliance affected the BL's capabilities on production and design from its earliest days 
till its take over by BMW in 1994. 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
The first comment that should be made is that the influence of Honda-designed models on 
the Rover's reputation for reliability and quality was radical, notably improving its brand image. As 
productivity levels are concerned, not all Rover's facilities experienced the same changes in their 
production processes; thereby productivity figures diverge across the plants. After several planning 
mistakes and false economies in the first days, mainly due to the exactly replication of Honda 
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Japanese facilities in the U. K., the Longbridge facility has become a champion within Rover ofthe 
Honda way. Solihull, -the house of Land and Range Rover, has been little influenced by Honda, 
whereas Cowley only produces Honda-derived products. While Longbridge follows a Toyota 
approach as regards batch sizes and customer's options, Cowley has a lot tradition of mass 
producer, more closed to the Honda manufacturing approach. 
As the venture grew and developed, Rover had come to rely on Honda for the majority of its 
product development activities (see the production figures in Table 1). It has maintained the core skills 
needed to develop new vehicles, like the Rover 100, but it does not have the financial resources to 
maintain vehicle development across the full range (see the profit trajectory in Table 1). In fact, the 
never-ending financial problems of the group led to its sale to BAe, but this sale didn't disturb the 
relationship with Honda Motor. Even more, since it had acquired a relative financial stability, the 
relationship was further strengthened. 
INSERT TABLE I,ABOUTHERE 
An analysis of the current portfolio of Rover products evidences its reliance on Honda for 
design and development programmes (see Figure 6). The 800, 600, 400 and 200 series belong to the 
period ofthe joint development with Honda. The Rover 100 was developed from the Metro, the last 
big independent BL model programme, but had a new engine, -from the k-series, and a Peugeot gear-
box; the Mini was an evolution of the 1960s design made on original production facilities. Pilkington 
(1998) remembers us that Rover could produce the ageing Metro and Mini models independently, but 
these were relatively unprofitable and did not alone represent a means of securing Rover's future. The 
Rover 100 is the only car produced by Rover which hold out any promise of a profitable, independent 
future. But, unfortunately, this was not sufficient to move away from Honda for the design of its other 
products. So far, Rover was caught in a vicious circle in which financial constraints limit the 
company's ability to design and develop new product fast enough to maintain its range. As a matter of 
fact, Rover failed to post any significant returns during its relationship with Honda (see Table 1). As 
Pilkington (1988) remarks, "when Rover has made little or no cash surplus for the last twenty years, 
the rate and extent to which new models can be replaced and redesigned is limited". 
Honda, on the other hand, concentrated on learning about the European market and gaining an 
understanding of the structure and nature of car manufacturing in Europe. It is now approaching the 
same production volume in the UK as the long established Nissan plant, but has a greater depth of 
presence in the supply base, which has already paid dividends during the slow down in the European 
market during the early 1990s. 
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In early 1994, BMW, a wealthy specialist, took over the majority of the British smaller 
volume producer, following a complete different approach to the one dominating the eighties' 
scenery, -volume producers acquiring specialists. According to Hudson and Schamp (1995, 236), 
the merger opened new market segments to BMW, broadening their product portfolio, mainly the 
small sized cars (Mini, Rover 100) and the off-roads vehicles (Land Rover and Range Rover). From 
the production and operations management point of view, it allowed BMW to use its diesel motor 
in the Rover models, as well as to achieve increasing economies of scale through the shared use of 
body platforms, -like is the case of BMW 5 and Rover 800. Furthermore, the German Company 
potentially gained access to Japanese production techniques and a useful, existing joint venture. 
Nevertheless, Honda almost immediately decided to pull of its fifteen years partnership with Rover 
after the take over. Initial press reports suggesting that Honda would pull out ofthe joint venture were 
rather speculative, but had this been the case, some 71 per cent of Rover's 1994 Honda-derived output 
would have been threatened by the run-down of contractual arrangements. 
4 The Alliance Seat / Volkswagen 
Seat started its activity in 1950, being its main shareholders several Spanish banks and the Torino 
(Italy) carmaker Fiat. This last company occupied several positions at the advisory board, provided 
the Spanish company with the required process technology and technical assistance, and gave the 
licences for the manufacturing of the Spanish versions of the Fiat models. 
The economic development experienced by Spain in the 60's led to an enormous increasing 
of Seat indicators, as they pertain to sales, workforce and profitability. Nevertheless, it wasn't until 
1967 that the company commenced to worry about its lack of strategic planning and its 
corresponding translation into the required technical and organisational infrastructure. Seat 
operated under an economic situation close to monopoly until 1972. In that year, the Spanish 
Government changed the regulatory framework, allowing foreign companies to operate in the 
country and to import all those car components which were not manufacturing in Spain, as well as 
the reinforcing of exports. This led to the opening of the Ford factory near Valencia, which was 
responsible for the manufacturing ofthe Ford Fiesta model. 
Seat's share of the Spanish market stated its decline as far as 1974, mainly in the small size 
segment, and the company decided to abandon some models and to focus its efforts in the medium 
cars segment, like the Seat 127 model. According to Alvarez and Gonzalez (1997), the domestic 
sales of Seat descended to a 29,94% in 1979, from a percentage of 51 ,2 in 1974. Such decline made 
Seat managers to consider the manufacturing of cars for exportation purposes, so that the over 
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capacity problems could be some way diluted. However, its export figures suffered a continuous 
decreasing, due to the fact that the company wasn't fully integrated in a multinational firm, and to 
its lack of all required capabilities related to R&D and New Product and Process Development. 
These problems led Seat to ask for help and technical support from Fiat. Nevertheless, that 
company was facing important internal troubles (Conti and Enrietti, 1995) and refused to maintain 
its share in Seat, and the public owned Spanish holding named 1Nl1 took care of the company. 
Then, in 1981, Fiat ended up any kind of relationship with Seat and authorised the Spanish firm to 
establish all type of ventures with other carmakers. Seat needed to reduce its costs as much as 
possible, mainly by means of strategic changes in technologies including from concept 
development through production. It also required increasing quality as a means of achieving 
competitive differentiation, as well as to build some capabilities related to product variety and 
readiness for model changes. Of course, customer satisfaction levels would have to be increased .. 
Besides, Seat's product portfolio included a high number of Fiat's cars. This was, or could have 
been, a disadvantage for Seat, since the Torino firm had specialised in the lowest segments of the 
car markets. Thus, the Spanish company was bound to separate its image from that of Fiat. In 
addition, the Seat versions of the Fiat cars, i.e., the 131, 127/Fura, and RitmolRonda models, were 
completely outdated, in spite of the fact that they were among the best sellers of the 1982 Spanish 
domestic market. Only the Panda model has a European look and performed pretty well in the 
European markets. 
That these problems were well known by Seat executives is probed by the fact that its 
Corporate Strategic Plan for the period 1982-1986 recognised them and suggested action lines 
aiming at their solution. Such Plan stated, as the main long-term objectives of the firm, the 
following ones: 
to continuously keep an up-dated products range; 
to launch new models, easy to export to both South America and Europe; 
to develop two new models, completely designed and engineered by Seat, known as the 
models Ibiza and Malaga, and 
to launch new models derivated of already existing Volkswagen vehicles, like the Polo 
model and its versions, as well as the Passat and Variant models. 
The 1Nl holding was not interested at all in keeping Seat in its portfolio, but the Spanish 
economic, social, and political conditions of the early eighties discouraged to privatise the 
company. Seat managers were looking for alternatives that would allow the firm to renew its 
I Instituto Nacional de Industria ("National Institute for the Industry"). 
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technological base while keeping stable the work force scenery. Then, the INI started to explore 
suitable finns that will transfer the required technological update and financial support without 
firing any employee. It was not an easy task and several potential allies were contacted, such as the 
Japanese finns Nissan and Toyota. Finally, Seat was able to reach an agreement with the Gennan 
company Volkswagen. 
There were at least two main reasons for Volkswagen's relocating the production of small 
models in Spain: having access to the rapidly growing domestic market and the comparatively 
lower cost of a qualified workforce. So far, Volkswagen, which needed to keep a portion of the 
small-size models market, could accomplished it by manufacturing both the small Seat cars and the 
VW Polo model. VW could have wished to enter the Spanish market and industry with a wholly 
owned subsidiary, in order to maintain control over the foreign operation and co-ordinate its 
activities with those of other foreign subsidiaries. However, it would have been unable to do so 
because the local government imposed the above mentioned on foreign finns. In these instances, 
entering the market via an IJV seemed to be an acceptable, yet second-best, solution (Reuer, 1988). 
Thus, both companies were interested in signing a Joint Venture that would allow 
Volkswagen to penetrate the Spanish market while Seat would develop some technological 
capabilities that it would learn from its partner. Still, it is very logic to assume that Volkswagen 
didn't want to risk too much resources and knowledge in Seat, since this late company was going to 
be privatised very soon. Just consider that the INs' value chain configuration of sourcing, 
production, marketing, and other activities may need adapting if the business were no longer to 
depend on a closely related selling partner (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995). Although there is no explicit 
evidence of it, it is very likely that that VW benefited from the possibility of negotiating a call 
option on its strategic alliance with seat. Such kind of options would have given VW the right, but 
not the obligation, to acquire Seat, negotiating the purchase price at the time of the IN fonnation, 
i.e., in 1982. 
In 1982 Seat and Volkswagen signed their strategic alliance, labelled as the "Acuerdo de 
Cooperacion Industrial, Licencia y Asistencia Tecnica,,2, which was estimated to last seven years. 
Seat wouldn't be able to manufacture Volkswagen vehicles until 1984, except for some lots of the 
Passat and Variants models, which would be manufactured at the Seat's plant of Zona Franca. From 
1984 to 1988, Seat manufactured the VW's models Passat, Santana and Variant. Tables 2, 3, and 4, 
show the continuous increasing pace of the production of badge models, thus allowing the Spanish 
plants to amortise their fixed costs associated to the acquisitions of new product and process 
2 Agreement for Industrial Cooperation, Licensing and Technical Support 
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technologies, and enabling the VW's group to manufacture with lower costs than those observed at 
the Gennan facilities. It would also pennitted the increasing of the exports not only to Spain, but 
also to the countries in its influence area. As a matter of fact, the size of the exportation network 
increased from the 599 sale points of 1983 to the 2517 of 1987. Seat improved its brand image 
almost immediately, benefiting from the reputation of high quality and reliability that the Gennan 
vehicle has achieved. Even the Seat logo (badge) was redesigned, as well as the brand image 
transmitted and publicised to the customers. 
INSERT TABLES 2,3 AND 4, ABOUT HERE 
As a consequence of the strategic alliance, Seat underwent a profound transfonnation, that 
included the upgrading of its workforce at the Landaben and Zona Franca facilities, the 
modernisation of the equipment and plants, and the re-organisation of the supply chain. These 
changes were aimed at enabling these facilities to manufacture the VW Polo Classic and Coupe at 
Landaben, -the original Authi plant near Pamplona, acquired by Seat, plant in 1984, -it was 
transfonned into an assembly platfonn, and the Passat and Variant models in Zona Franca, whose 
production was initiated in 1982. Old Seat models, such as Seat 131, 127 Fura, Panda, and Ronda, 
were still in the portfolio of Seat in 1986, thus meaning that in Zona Franca different technologies, 
from state-of-the-art ones to the older equipment provided by Fiat several years ago, were being 
simultaneously used, with the corresponding problems that it might imply. As a matter of fact, the 
Seat facilities were clearly lacking of the advanced manufacturing technologies that its most 
relevant competitors were profusely employing at the beginning of the decade of the eighties. This 
obsolescence paired Seat's lagging behind other car makers located in Spain as regards the 
implementation of new operations management philosophies and models. Figure7 illustrate these 
points. 
INSERT FIGURE 7, ABOUT HERE 
Seat was able to launch two new models in 1984, the Ibiza model, and in 1985, the Malaga, 
that were manufactured, as well, at Zona Franca. Only the Ibiza was a Seat model, because the 
Malaga one was an adaptation of the VW Jetta. Alvarez and Gonzalez (1997, ) affinned that Seat 
had a very large portfolio along the period 1983-86, in spite of the fact that the units produced 
remained practically fixed, showing a strategy that clearly diverged from the one followed by their 
Spanish competitors at the time. Such strategy disturbed Seat from focusing in the development of 
16 
completely new models like it had done in the years previous to 1984 with its Ibiza. Instead, Seat 
R&D people started to learn how to incorporate advances from VW models into the Seat models, 
and how to improve the manufacturing process and even the design of the VW badge models 
manufactured in Spain. 
To summarise, Seat was able to achieve its corporate strategic goals, since it broadened its 
export network, could use its over capacity for manufacturing high reputation models like VW 
Passat, Variant and Polo, it improved its brand image and could increase the quality levels of its car 
as well as their innovation degree. Moreover, it was able to launch the Ibiza and Malaga models, in 
spite of the fact that this late one was inspired in the VW technology instead of being a completely 
new car. 
In 1986, Volkswagen decided to end up with the alliance and acquire Seat. Then, the 
Spanish car marker became the third member of the VW Consortium, together with VW and Audi. 
The German company pursued a singular strategy in the eighties, dedicating one model to one plant 
and keeping Seat as a separate make of small cars. As Shown by Table 5, Seat facility at Landaben 
has largely contribute to the success of the Polo in Europe, since it is a reliable model that can be 
sold at a reasonable price, as its relatively cheaper manufacturing costs permit it. 
INSERT TABLE 5, ABOUT HERE 
This strategy was continued in the early 90s, when VW took over Skoda with the aim of 
penetrating the East European markets with small cars. As the other German automobile producers, 
it created a segmentation between foreign production sites in the European fringe, producing 
mainly small cars, and domestic production, while retaining capacities and competencies for R&D 
and production of larger, more expensive models in Germany (Schamp, 1995). 
We have elaborated the Figure 8 aiming at summarising the evolution of the new product 
development process at Seat. We have considered both its joint venture with Volkswagen and its 
privatisation and take over by VW. 
INSERT FIGURE 8, ABOUT HERE 
5. The consequences of the strategic alliances for Rover and Seat 
As it was previously suggested in Section 2, it is very likely that Honda were looking for an 
entrance not only in the European car market, but in the UK. components market as well, when it 
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signed its strategic alliance with Rover. By so doing, Honda would be able to warranty to its long-term 
Japanese suppliers the economic feasibility of their investments and innovations. Such innovations 
were strongly related to Honda capability to launch new products, to the possibility of obtaining 
economies of scale and learning by doing, and to the fast recovering of investments that lower 
manufacturing costs make possible. 
It seems that Rover managers were aware ofHonda's objectives, this fact explaining why the 
1979's deal with Honda was explicitly limited to the development of a car model to produced for two 
or three years while the MontegolMaestro design was being finished. However, Rover became more 
and more involved in manufacturing badge products and in "roverising" the Honda models. Schill et 
aI., (1994, 262) pointed out that "Rover managers realised that the company was to be in a situation 
where 70 percent of the car would be bought-in". They decided that the firm had to make sure that the 
remaining 30 percent were high value-added for Rover and that the firm achieved a centre of 
excellence on those key items. According to such objective, Rover built vertical alliances in these parts 
ofthe value-added chain that will link and support the internal centres of excellence. 
Honda supported this policy of Rover, since the collective action of the partners that provide 
technology, complementary capabilities, and resources will assist each other in achieving objectives 
in different segments of the automotive industry. Furthermore, it would provide sufficient 'critical 
mass' to make feasible the development of a regional network of allied key suppliers in the 
Midlands of the UK as well. Such policy implied that Rover would have to concentrate on 
developing and manufacturing high value-added components, while, at the same time, it would 
have to be specially careful selecting those components and systems that are perceived by the 
customers as important technological signals. Thus, Rover's functional overlap pertained to R&D, 
product development, manufacturing quality assurance, and reduction of the product cycle-areas of 
corporate capability that spanned several functional activities within both companies. 
Schill et al. (1994) pointed out that the whole UK industry benefited from the horizontal and 
vertical alliances of Rover, which allowed the car components industry to achieve the following 
distinctive capabilities: 
Better focused and improved core competencies; 
Substantial decrease in the rate of innovation time to the market; 
Substantial cost reductions for the vertically allied firms; 
Integrated development and reduced duplication. 
When analysing the success of the alliance signed by Rover and Honda, as it pertains to the 
development of the core capabilities linked to the new product design and development processes, 
the available information is contradictory, thus confirming our hypothesis of technological 
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addiction. Effectively, one hand it seems as if Rover was initially looking for a situation of 
"convergent development"(Nakamura et aI., 1996), which would allow the firm to learn from 
Honda, while keeping its distinctive competencies in engine's and key components design related 
activities. As a matter of fact, at the time the alliance ceased, Rover was able to manufacture the 
Metro and Mini models, which were quite unprofitable, and the Rover 100, the only profitable 
model in Rover's medium and long-term portfolio. The British firm was also capable to design new 
series of engines. On the other hand, as we have already cited in Section 3 (see Table 1), Pilkington 
(1998) has manifested that Rover was completely unable to post any significant return during its 
relationship with Honda. We are facing, then, a case where the financial constraints have prevented 
a firm to emphasise its R&D capabilities, so that it has looked for an alternative way to access the 
required knowledge instead of its acquisition. Thus, a "divergent development" has taken place 
instead of the effect the firm was looking for. Since Rover has been unable to react to this type of 
non-wished effect, we affirm that it was technologically addicted to Honda. 
Opposite to Japanese firms, the common strategy among European individual producers has 
been an upgrading of the functions of the European core. In the case of VW it means the allocation 
of the manufacturing of the core components, -power train, suspension, cockpits, engines, and 
platforms-, in Wolfsburg. The different brands in the consortium are responsible for the design and 
manufacturing of the so-called "hUt" (chassis), which implies that both Seat and Skoda are 
competing with VW's core plant at Wolfsburg for R&D functions. The increasing competencies in 
R&D efforts and responsibilities are partially shared by first tier systems suppliers, as part of long-
term collaborative agreements. Thus, some high value-added activities, like engine production and 
development, use to be kept under the reins of the parent company. This strategy explains why VW 
never helped Seat to increase those of its core capabilities associated to the design and development 
of the key components of its vehicles. It didn't allow the Spanish firm to manufacture high value-
added elements, such as VW badge engines, power trains, platforms, etc., probably as a means of 
decreasing the potential development of some learning by doing effect. 
After the take over in 1986, Seat became the third brand of the VW Consortium, and it has 
enjoyed some autonomy to manage the distribution channels of its own vehicles. From 1987 til11990, 
Seat concentrated all its R&D efforts in the re-styling of its Ibiza and MaIaga models. Besides, the 
Landaben plant was renewed in 1987 to manufacture the third face-lifts ofVW Polo Coupe. In 1988 
relevant investments were made in the plant at Zona franca, looking for reducing the most relevant 
bottlenecks. In 1990 new investments were made in Landaben as to allow such facility to manufacture 
1.200 units per day of the Polo engines, and one year later, it was necessary to increase its 
manufacturing capacity in order to increase its capacity to 1.000 vehicles per day. 
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Heavy modernisation efforts took place in Zona Franca for the launching of the new model 
Toledo. This new model, which combines the VW platform with a "Mediterranean" design of its 
"hut", -the style of Seat R& D people, is the first example of how Seat increased its absorptive 
capacity, -which means according to Lane and Lubatkin (1998, 462), its ability to value, assimilate, 
and apply knowledge from a learning alliance partner, as it grew familiar with the set of organisational 
problems ofVW. Then, the Toledo car constitutes a first hand example of Lane and Lubatkin (1998, 
465) work hypothesis, which establishes that "the more familiar the student partner is with the 
problems and projects that the teachers prefers, the more readily it will be able to commercially apply 
new knowledge from that teacher". The only problem, but not irrelevant to our purposes, is that Seat 
and VW stopped being partners by 1986. 
These situations have being experienced again with the launching of the Ibiza New Style, and 
the new model Cordoba (1992). Seat has also participated in the design of the Inca (1995) and 
Alhambra models (1996). Obviously, it could not have manufactured all of them at Zona Franca, so, a 
new, state of the art facility, was built by 1993, known as the Martorell plant. After a transitional stage, 
the Zona Franca facility was closed down and the manufacturing of Seat cars, and several badge 
models, was moved to Martorell. 
However, Seat designers and engineers have been able to design two new cars from scratch, 
with the solely exception of the platform, -VW has imposed to all the Consortium members to share 
the same platforms. This is the case of the Arosa model, launched in 1997. And it has been also the 
case of the "New Toledo" model, launched in 1998. We consider these success as very relevant to our 
study, since they show that Seat interest on developing its new models, as expressed by its 1983 
Corporate Plan (see Section 4), in spite of it many difficulties, is fmally coming to a happy end. 
We can classify Seat and VW strategic alliance as one of the type of "divergent 
development"(Nakamura et aI., 1996), since there was no technological overlap between Seat and 
Volkswagen during its relationship. At that time, any kind of knowledge and capabilities that Seat 
might have required for manufacturing the badge models was accessed from VW, although some 
constraints were settled to prevent Seat from learning "too much". However, since VW had always 
considered to acquire Seat when it were privatised, some type of "convergent development" 
happened to surge. Such learning may remain latent until a situation where it is required takes 
place. Then, since this situation did not take place before the privatisation, VW did not have to pay 
for it. This coincide with the theoretical framework that suggests that "the parent firm performance 
implications of sign an IJV are therefore not only a function of benefits and costs obtained from 
operating the business, but also the way in which the IJVs' resources are priced upon termination. 
Even more broadly, the total impact of a venture on parent firms depends upon how firms manage 
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all IJV life-cycle stages, ranging from partner scanning to partner selection and negotiation to 
setting up and implementing the venture to the IJVs' ultimate termination"(Reuer, 1998) . 
Some years later, when the Martorell plant commenced to get some profitability from the 
enormous investments that were made and the huge crisis of 1993 was very far away, that 
"convergent development" re-appeared. 
Another interesting effect of the SeatlVW 1982's agreement is that along the last decade, 
carmakers and component manufacturers in Spain have perfecting of the rationalisation process as 
well as the implementation of the Lean Production strategies. Some examples are the closing of the 
"montaje 1" of FASA-Renault in 1990, and the drastical reduction of the production in the Zona 
Franca (Seat) plant. Moreover, the Spanish automobile Industry has seen the increasing 
internalisation of components, which are replaced by imports from the parent company or 
procurement from suppliers. Thus, local subsidiaries have become more integrated into the 
international production chain of the parent companies. In 1993, the Parque Industrial de 
Premontaje (PIPS) opened its doors for 15 component suppliers to the new flexible Martorell plant 
of Seat, producing the new Ibiza model near Barcelona. 
The literature on Rover and Seat (Alvarez and Gonzalez, 1997; GonzaIez, 1998; Pilkington, 
1996, 1998; Schill et a1. 1994) does not include as yet too much empirical data about the financial 
and non-financial indicators of the success or failure of their alliances. It is easy to understand since 
competitive reasons use to prevent companies from providing sensible data to the academicians. 
We have tried to summarise it in Figure 9. 
6. Managerial implications and suggestions for further research 
This study provides some guidelines for managers when it comes to forming successful strategic 
alliances with a view to developing the unique assets of the companies involved. Forming the 
alliances needs to be considered very carefully by the participating companies. 
The cases analysed here fulfil the prerequisites suggested by Beamish and Inkpen (1995,34) 
for an alliance to become operational, i.e., both Rover and Seat enjoyed, prior to the venture, three 
broad areas of knowledge: customer knowledge, manufacturing product and process knowledge, 
and local operational knowledge. 
INSERT FIGURE 9, ABOUT HERE 
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The two alliances here analysed are very similar from the point of view that they only 
concerned certain projects covering the development of specific vehicles. The companies 
maintained a distance between each other, and developed separate product plans -Rover and Seat 
incorporating Honda and Volkswagen models into its own plans when these were offered3• They 
also coincide in some of the reasons moving their teachers partners to agree with having them as 
student allies, i.e., the foreign partners, -Honda and Volkswagen, were seeking to expand its 
geographic scope of operations, and then, the local partner's knowledge of local economic, 
political, and cultural environments could be an essential contribution to the joint venture. Besides, 
both companies belong now to German companies and have started to say good buy to red financial 
figures. And, what is more important, they became technological addicted to its teacher partners. 
However, they differ in the form in which their strategic alliances ceased, and also in the 
trajectory of their learning processes. In Rover case, what started as a "convergent development" 
joint venture, ended up as a "divergent development". The opposite is true in the Seat case. As 
Mowery et aI., (1996) advanced: "the learning that takes place within alliances thus appear to be 
more complex than most of the literature on this topic suggests, underlining the need for better 
definitions of learning in theoretical discussions of alliance activity and high lighting this as an 
area ripe for further study". 
Most salients observations from our study are: 
i.- We have empirically contrasted that student firms have the greatest potential to learn from 
teachers with similar basic knowledge, but different specialised knowledge is often the motivation 
for establishing interorganisational collaborations, as suggested by Hamel (1991). 
ii.- Our study confirms also that alliances should be considered as mutual dynamic learning devices 
in which the process of learning is critical, as well as participating in the process, not the exchange 
of outcomes, as it l1as been proposed by Glaister and Buckley (1996) 
iii.- One valuable capability that both Rover and Seat have learned from their teachers partners is the 
tailoring of existing designs from other manufacturers to produce 'Roverised' products. Unfortunately, 
neither Rover, nor Seat, learned enough from their teachers and the ever-greater lack of design 
capability (both in terms of expertise and resource) was manifest in the management of Rover and Seat 
limited new model programmes. 
iv.- As suggested by Schill et al. (1994,625), our article raises the issue oflearning how to learn as 
3 It is very likely that both "big",-or "teachers", partners shared some of the costs with their "child", -or "students", partners 
in return for manufacturing rights 
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a competitive advantage: both Rover and Seat were interesting investments for BMW and VW, in 
spite of their relative failure in their learning processes. Rover and seat cases show that it is the rate 
of learning and not just the learning itself that is important. 
Our results suggest the need for a richer conceptual framework in considering the effects of 
alliance activity on firm-specific knowledge and capabilities. The approach provides a platform to 
further investigate each of the areas in our framework and provides a point of integration for more 
specialised research. For instance, our study can be extended to the learning process of the British 
and Spanish OEMs Industry, to identify how their new products and process development activities 
have been affected by the technological addiction of some of its main customers. As well, the 
approach may help forge a better alignment between academic descriptions and prescriptions and 
the reality faced by managers. 
Mowery et al. (1996, 89) emphasised that "Research on resource -and knowledge-based 
views of the firm, along with related work on interfirm alliances, has been tampered by the lack of 
measures of firm-specific capabilities. These difficulties have meant that discussion of the motives 
and effects of alliance activity has proceeded in a virtual empirical vacuum, and competing views 
of alliance activity have rarely brought into sharp focus." We hope that our paper can raise 
interesting issues that help other researchers to suggest new sets of measures. 
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Appendix: 
Figure 1: Review of the literature of strategic alliances (Based in S~rensen and Reve, 1998, 152) 
Research line Main argument 
Resource-<lependent approach, The company tries to control the assets 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 which can minimise its dependence on 
the environment 
Transaction Cost Theol)', Knowing its efficiency border, the 
Williamson, 1979, 1981, 1985, company has to decide whether it 
1991 should make or buy its assets, or 
whether it should rely on alliances 
Political Economy Approach, The economic system and the socio-
Benson, 1975, Stem and Reve, political system jointly influence 
1980 col1ective behaviour and performance 
Agency Theol)', Fama, 198O, The basic organisational question is 
Hart and Holmstrom, 1987 how to align principal and agent 
interests 
Relational Contracting Theol)', Trust plays a mayor part in the 
Hakanson, 1982, ,Axelson and development of co-operative alliances 
Easton, 1992, etc. 
Interaction Approach Not only trust and confidence are 
important, but the process of 
relationship formation as wen 
Competitive positioning Companies with unique assets enter 
models, Porter, 1980, BuckJey unto relationships with other companies 
eta\. 1988 with similar assets to improve their 
economic performance 
Figure 2: Alliances of the European carrnakers until 1996 
Finn Equity-sharing Joint-venture Procurement Distribution Technological Assembly agreement 
agreement 
Volkswagen BAZ CNAIC, First Auto BAZ, CNAIC, First Toyota First Auto Works, BAZ, First Auto Works 
(Gennany) Works, Auto Work, Ford, Porsche, Toyota Porsche, Toyota 
(includes Audi, Seat, Ford (Auto Latin, Nissan, Rover, Volvo 
Skoda) Auto Europe), 
Mercedes- Benz, 
Toyota (Hilux) 
Fiat (Italy): Zastava, BAZ Ford, Peugeot Ford, Fuji Heavy Ford, Mazda Fuji Heavy, Nissan Bertone, Mazda, 
(includes Alfa (Subaru) Pininfarina 
Romeo, Autobianchi, GM, Peugeot, Renault, 
Ferrari, Iveco, Steyr 
Lancia, Innocenti. 
FSM) 
PSA (France) Daihatsu. Fiat. Fiat. Nissan, Renault, CAC,Mazda Daihatsu, Renault CAC, Chrysler. Honda 
(Includes Peugeot. Renault Rover. Steyr Isuzu. Pininfarina. 
Citroen) Rover. Suzuki Renault 
Renault (France) Volvo Peugeot. Toyota, Fiat. Ford, GM. GM Peugeot. Volvo Peugeot 
Volvo Mitsubishi. 
Peugeot. Volvo. Fuji 
Heavy (Subaru) 
Mercedes-Benz GM Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Cycl e & Carriage Mazda Cycle & Carriage 
(Gennany) 
Ssangyong Volkswagen Porsche. Ssangyong Mitsubishi. Porsche. Ssangyong Honda, Porsche. 
Ssangyong Ssangyong 
Rover (United Honda Honda Chrysler. FSO. GM. Honda Honda Ford 
Kingdom) Peugeot Honda, 
Peugeot. Volkswagen 
BMW (Gennany) Rover Bertone. Daihatsu Ford 
Porsche (Germany) Mercedes-Benz Mazda. Mercedes- Mercedes-Benz. 
Benz Volkswagen 
Volkswagen. Volvo 
Volvo (Sweden) Renault Ford, GM, Fuji Heavy (Subaru). Daewoo. Fuji Isuzu, Mitsubishi. Fuji Heavy 
Mitsubishi Mitsubishi, Renault. Heavy. Isuzu Porsche, Renault 
Renault Volkswagen 
Source: Yoshino and Srinivasa (1996.26-31). Pilkington (1996,91) 
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Figure 3: Alliances of the USA cannakers unti11996: 
Firm Joint-venture Procurement Distribution Technological Assembly agreement 
agreement 
General Motors: Chrysler, Daewoo Fiat, Fuji Heavy (Subaru), CAC, Isuzu, Renault, Chrysler, Ford, Bertone, CAC, Daewoo, 
(includes Opel, Ford, FSO, Isuzu, Honda, Isuzu, Mitsubishi, Toyota Honda, Isuzu, Suzuki, Isuzu, Suzuki 
Vauxhall, Holden's Nissan, Suzuki, Nissan, Renault, V AZ Toyota 
Saturn, Saab) Toyota, Volvo, Gold Rover, Suzuki, Toyota, V AZ 
Cup 
Ford (includes Fiat, GM, Mazda, AZLK, Flat, Fuji Heavy Fiat, Kia, Mazda, Chrysler, GM, Kia, BMW, Kia, Mazda, 
Jaguar) Nissan, Toyota, (Subaru), Suzuki Mazda, Nissan Nissan, Rover, Suzuki 
Volkswagen, Volvo Mazda, Nissan, Renault, 
Volkswagen 
Chrysler Bejing Auto, GM, De Bejing Auto, Mitsubishi, Honda, V AZ, Fiat Bejing Auto, Ford, Mitsubishi, Peugeot, 
Tomasso Rover, Steyr, Fiat GM, Steyr 
Styer, Mitsubishi Mitsubishi, Steyr 
Source. Yoshmo and Snmvasa (1996,26-31), Pllkmgton (1996,91). 
Figure 4: Alliances of the Japanese cannakers unti11996: 
Firm Equity Sharing Joint-venture Procurement Distribution Technological Assembly agreement 
agreement 
Toyota Daihatsu Daihatsu, Ford, Daihatsu Daihatsu, GM, Daihatsu, GM, Nissan, CNAIC, Daihatsu, 
GM GM Volkswagen Volkswagen Volkswagen 
Nissan, Renault, 
Volkswagen 
Nissan Fuji Heavy Ford, Fuji Heavy, Daewoo, Ford, Fuji Fuji Heavy, Daewoo, Fiat, Ford, Ford, Fuji Heavy 
(Subaru), Siam GM, Toyota Heavy,GM, Mazda Fuji Heavy, Mazda, Siam Motors, Yulon 
Motors, Yulon Peugeot, Second Second Auto Works, 
Auto Works, Toyota 
Volkswagen, Yulon 
Honda Rover Mitsubishi, Rover Daewoo,GM, Chrysler, Daewoo, GM, Rover Daewoo, Isuzu, 
Mitsubishi, Rover Daewoo, Rover Peugeot, 
Mercedes-Benz, 
Mitsubishi 
Mazda Ford, Kia Ford,lsuzu Ford, Isuzu, Kia Cycle & Ford, Kia, Mercedes- Cycle & Carriage, 
Mitsubishi, Suzuki Carriage, Fiat, Benz Fiat, Ford, 
Ford, N issan, Porsche Kia, Suzuki 
Isuzu, Kia, 
Nissan, 
Peugeot 
Mitsubishi China Motors, Chrys ler, Honda, Chrysler, GM, Hyundai, Chrysler, Hyundai, China Motors, 
Hyundai, Mercedes-Benz, Honda, Hyundai, Mercedes- Proton Chrysler, 
Proton Suzuki, Volvo Mazda, Mercedes- Benz, Volvo Honda, Isuzu 
Benz, Proton, 
Renault, Volvo 
Suzuki GM GM, Mitsubishi, Daewoo Ford Daewoo,GM First Auto Workers, 
Peugeot GM Ford, 
Mazda GM, Mazda 
Fuji Heavy Nissan Isuzu, Nissan, Fiat, Ford, GM, Nissan, Volvo Fiat, N issan Nissan, Volvo 
(Subaru) Siam Motors Nissan, Volvo 
Daihatsu Toyota Peugeot, Toyota BMW, Kia, Toyota Toyota Kia, Peugeot, Toyota Bertone, Toyota 
Isuzu GM Fuji Heavy, GM, Daewoo,GM, GM,Mazda, Daewoo, GM, Volvo GM, Honda, 
Mazda Mazda Volvo Mitsubishi, Peugeot 
.. Source: Yoshmo and Snmvasa (1996,26-31), Pllkmgton (1996,91) 
Figure 5: Alliances in the automobile industry prior to 1996: 
Firm Equity Sharing Joint-venture Procurement 
Volkswagen (Germany) (includes Audi) Porsche Seat, Nissan 
PSA (France) (Includes Peugeot y Citriien) Chrysler Renault, Volvo 
Renault (France) Volvo,AMC PSA 
Rover (U. K.) Honda 
General Motors (USA) (includes Opel, Vauxhall) Isuzu, Suzuki Toyota, Daewoo Nissan 
Ford (USA) (includes Ford Europa) Mazda 
Chrysler (USA) PSA, Mitsubishi 
Toyota (Japan) Lotus General Motors 
Nissan (Japan) Motor lberica, Subaru AlfaRomeo General Motors, 
Volkswagen 
Mitsubishi (Japan) Hyundai Daimler-Benz 
Source. Burgner, 1986 
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Figure 6: Rover's portfolio of new models after its alliance with Honda 
MODEL FACTORS AGAINST THE ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING FACTORS PRO DEVELOPMENT OF 
AT ROVER FACILITIES AND R & D CENTERS DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING 
CAPABILITIES OF ROVER 
Triumph Acclaim • Licensing for an existing Honda model • Commercial Success 
• Little impact on BL Capabilities 
• Acquisition of a Honda production facility and the majority 
of the parts 
Rover 200 (1984) • Honda's engineers designed the mechanics • Partly designed by BL, to 
• Honda powered the 1300cc version distinguish its model from the 
• Poor quality levels of the Honda badges manufactured at Honda Ballade 
Longbridge • Rover produced the 1600cc engine 
• Postponement of programmes to replace the ageing product and gearbox 
range with internally designed products 
• The production facilities duplicated Honda's facilities in 
Japan 
Rover 800 1 • The greatest part of the design and all decisions concerning • Rover manufactured the 2.0 litres 
Honda Legend vehicles performance remained with Honda engine 
• Large numbers of parts have to be bought from Honda, 
mainly gearboxes and most of engines. 
• The facilities designed by Honda only allow producing 15 
unique variants, in spite of the fact that the commercial 
policy ofBL manages many millions of "unique" products. 
Rover 200/400 • Rover was left to adapt the design so that more luxurious • Some Rover engines, designed for (1990) vehicles could complement the product range the Rover 800, were incorporated to 
• The re-styling is against the usual practices of Japanese expand the product range, like the 
firms. 1600cc vehicle, and 1400cc Rover 
• Rover invested most of its design resources in the continuous K-series powered cars 
updating of its existing model • Some diesel versions were also 
• Rover had become dependent on Honda as regards New developed 
Product Development • The Honda Concept was 
manufactured at Longbridge 
Sterling • Face-lift of Rover 800 
• Models overpriced, poor ratio quality/price 
• Poor customer service 
Rover 600 1 • A Honda car with interiors that match the Rover brand image 
Honda Accord • Serious overcapacity and financial troubles due to the 
investment in splendid tri-axis press for the Swindon plant 
• Honda is investing in other locations in the UK 
Rover 400/Honda • Face-lift of the Rover 200/400, new body-styling and • New 1600cc and 1800cc versions of 
Civic (1995) minimal mechanical alterations the K -series engines 
• All Rover's design resources were devoted to these minor 
developments 
Figure 7: Process innovations in the Spanish automobile industry in 1986. 
Innovation GM Ford Renaul Seat Citriien Peugeot 
t -Talbot 
No. of 149 3 38 20 21 4 
robots in 
1982 
No. of 174 108 89 83 58 10 
robots in 
1986 
CAPP (or Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
similar) 
CAD/CAM No No No No No No 
Quality Partial Yes No No No Starting 
Circles develop 
ment 
JITmfg Yes Yes No No No No 
Source: Alvarez and Gonzalez, 1997. 
31 
Figure 8: Seat's portfolio of new models after its alliance with Volkswagen 
Year Launching of Designed and engineered by 
New Models 
1982 Polo VW 
Panda models: Seat (with Fiat engines) 
Marbella, 
Montana and 
Bavaria 
RitmolRonda Fiat: Re-styling of Ritmo Fiat 
1984 Polo Classic, VW: Re-styling of Polo 
Polo Coupe 
Ibiza Seat (with Giugiaro design, Porsche, 
System engine, Diesel engine 
options, etc.) 
1985 Malaga VW: Re-styling of Jetta VW 
NEW MODELS AFTER THE TAKE OVER BY 
VOLKSWAGEN 
1987 3 new versions mainly VW, with some 
of Malaga Mediterranean touch 
First re-styling 
of Ibiza 
1989 Ibiza II Seat, with the VW's platform 
1990 Toledo VW: platform and core, high added-
value components / Seat: Chassis and 
Mediterranean touch 
3rd re-styling VW 
of Polo 
1991 Ibiza New Seat, with the VW's platform 
Style 
1992 Cordoba VW: platform and core, high added-
value components / Seat: Chassis and 
Mediterranean touch 
1995 Inca VW: platform and core, high added-
value components I Seat: Chassis and 
Mediterranean touch 
1996 Alhambra Auto Europa, with high levels of 
involvement for Seat 
1997 Arosa Mainly Seat, with a VW's platform. 
1998 New Toledo Mainly Seat, with a VW's platform 
Figure 9: Competitive capabilities developed by Rover and Seat as results of the alliance 
Competitive capabilities 
• Lower costs: due to the out-sourcing 
practices and the collaborative manufacturing 
• Technology transfer: new production 
methods were implemented, and new 
equipment was installed to manufacture both 
the badge and own vehicles 
• Quality improvement 
• Cycle reduction: up to one third below the 
cycle time before the alliance 
• Europeanisation: the distribution networks 
expanded notoriously in both cases 
• Flexibility: both companies were able to fIU 
very quickly their customers orders as a 
consequence of the high commonality 
between the car components 
• nT procurement 
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• Tables: 
Table 1. The Effect of the Alliance on Rover's Fortunes. (Pilkington, 1998) 
Year Turnover Profit /(Loss) Rover Honda (£M) (£M) Units· units 
1981 2,869 (503) 367,875 20,447 
1982 3,072 (300) 311,814 58,025 
1983 3,421 (142) 383,141 50,042 
1984 3,402 80 339,784 31,643 
1985 3,415 (138) 385,048 65,844 
1986 3,412 (892) 311,231 78,737 
1987 3,096 (26) 313,436 137,290 
1988 1,179" 35 304,605 145,970 
1989 3,430 64 294,831 139,985 
1990 3,785 55 229,775 187,576 
1991 3,744 (52) 154,046 205,905 
1992 3,684 (49) 122,400 216,654 
Notes: *excluding Land Rover; #part year figure from BAe Report. Source: Adapted from Pllkington (1998, 8) 
Table 2: Car units manufactured by Seat (1984-1992) 
Year Seat YW 
1984 225.548 53.438 
1985 224.892 95.319 
1986 231.885 106.663 
1987 275.151 131.240 
1988 327.737 105.745 
1989 350.034 124.115 
1990 361.629 143.750 
1991 360.510 191.700 
1992 356.210 222.222 
Source: Gonzalez (1998), complied from Company Reports and Accounts 
Table 3: Number of vehicles exported by Seat (1984-1992) 
Year Seat YW YW's % of total exports 
1984 131.895 17.038 11.44% 
1985 153.562 53.852 25.96% 
1986 120.254 69.197 36.53% 
1987 158.1 18 87.863 35.72% 
1988 193.499 75.941 28.18% 
1989 223.165 98.699 30.66% 
1990 243.165 125.406 33.99% 
1991 260.623 177.595 40.53% 
1992 253.313 212.092 45.67% 
Source: Gonzalez (1998), complied from: Company Reports and Accounts 
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Table 4: Car models sold and imported by Seat for its domestic market (1984-1992) 
Year SEAT(1) VW-Audi TOTAL Imported VW-
(2) (1)+ (2) Audi units 
1984 128.334 22.360 150.694 1.730 
1985 85.923 42.968 128.891 5.759 
1986 99.866 39.383 148.434 9.185 
1987 123.867 39.894 187.529 23.768 
1988 131.238 87.947 219.185 55.028 
1989 125.419 113.839 239.258 65.035 
1990 118.778 96.901 215.679 71.308 
1991 97.198 81.757 178.955 56.233 
1992 102.208 80.546 182.754 65.430 
Source: Gonzalez (1998), compded from Company Reports and Accounts 
Table 5: The manufacturing of the POLO (VW) 
Year Total number of units Germany Spain 
1988 215.332 110.716 104.616 
1999 228.867 104.752 116.095 
Source: EIU (1991, 78-9) 
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